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Abstract
Ever since the early days of European merger control, the European Commission (“Commis-
sion”) has relied heavily on information provided by the notifying parties and by relevant third
parties in carrying out its review of concentrations. More recently, the Commission has added
economic analyses and market surveys, as well as the review of internal documents, as major
elements. Over time, it is fair to say that the depth and breadth of the information gathering
and analysis has grown significantly, making European merger review a resource-intensive and
sometimes very drawn-out exercise. With that in mind, and after criticism from stakeholders, the
Commission has in recent months sought to streamline and simplify the process. In December
2013, it adopted a package of measures to that effect (“Merger Simplification Package”), and has
proposed some further measures in its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control,”
published in July 2014. This paper provides a high-level view of the way in which the Commis-
sion carries out a merger investigation nowadays. In particular, we focus on four areas that are key
to understanding the current anatomy of the fact-finding investigation. We also discuss the pro-
cess through which, in certain cases, the Commission grants access to file through a “data room”
procedure.
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Ever since the early days of European merger control,1 the 
European Commission (“Commission”) has relied heavily on 
                                                            
µ This Essay was first published in FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE, 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 2014 (Barry Hawk ed., 2015). This Essay is 
based on the legal context as of August 2014. 
* Partner at Linklaters LLP, Brussels.  
** Associate at Linklaters LLP, Brussels.  
1. The first Merger Regulation was adopted in 1989. See Council Regulation 
4064/89/EC on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. L 395/1. It 
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information provided by the notifying parties and by relevant third 
parties in carrying out its review of concentrations. More recently, the 
Commission has added economic analyses2 and market surveys, as 
well as the review of internal documents, as major elements. Over 
time, it is fair to say that the depth and breadth of the information 
gathering and analysis has grown significantly, making European 
merger review a resource-intensive and sometimes very drawn-out 
exercise.  
With that in mind, and after criticism from stakeholders, the 
Commission has in recent months sought to streamline and simplify 
the process. In December 2013, it adopted a package of measures to 
that effect (“Merger Simplification Package”),3 and has proposed 
some further measures in its White Paper “Towards more effective EU 
merger control,” published in July 2014.4 
This paper provides a high-level view of the way in which the 
Commission carries out a merger investigation nowadays. In 
particular, we focus on four areas that are key to understanding the 
current anatomy of the fact-finding investigation. We also discuss the 
process through which, in certain cases, the Commission grants 
access to file through a “data room” procedure. 
I. SUBMISSION OF NOTIFICATION: FORM CO OR SHORT 
FORM CO 
A. Pre-Notification Contacts and Notification of a Concentration 
Concentrations that have a Union dimension are required to be 
notified to the Commission using an official notification form, 
                                                                                                                                     
was replaced by an amended Regulation in 2004 after the first major overhaul. See Council 
Regulation 139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. L 
24/1 [hereinafter EUMR]. 
2. See, e.g., OECD Policy Roundtable, Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis 245-60 
(DAF/COMP(2011)23, July 27, 2012) [hereinafter OECD Policy Roundtable]. 
3. See Commission Regulation 802/2004/EC Implementing Council Regulation 
139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. L 133/1, 
amended by Commission Regulation 1033/2008/EC, 2008 O.J. L 279/3 and by Commission 
Implementing Regulation 1269/2013/EC, 2013 O.J. L 336/1 [hereinafter Implementing 
Regulation]; see also Commission Notice on a Simplified Procedure for Treatment of Certain 
Concentrations under Council Regulation 139/2004/EC, 2013 O.J. C 366/04 [hereinafter 
Notice on Simplified Procedure]. The Merger Simplification Package has been implemented 
through updates to the Implementing Regulation and the Notice on Simplified Procedure. 
4. See European Commission, White Paper: Towards More Effective EU Merger 
Control, COM (2014) 449 Final (July 2014)  [hereinafter White Paper]. 
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referred to as a “Form CO.”5 Certain categories of concentrations are 
eligible for treatment under the so-called “simplified procedure,” 
including those that do not give rise to so-called affected markets.6 
For this purpose, the notifying party may use a “Short Form CO,” 
which is less burdensome in terms of the information and data 
required.7 The rationale for this procedure is that a less in-depth 
review is required for transactions which are unlikely to raise any 
competition concerns. Since the Commission introduced it in 2000, 
the simplified procedure has been extensively used. At present, it is 
estimated to account for sixty to seventy percent of all notifications.8  
The submission of a Form CO requires the provision of 
considerable information on the undertakings concerned by the 
concentration, the concentration itself, the relevant product and 
geographic markets, the conditions of competition in the affected 
markets (including the structure of supply and demand, the degree of 
product differentiation and closeness of competition, market entry and 
exit, the nature and importance of research and development, the 
existence of cooperative agreements, information on trade 
associations), and contact details. In addition, the Form CO specifies 
the supporting documentation that must be provided, of which Section 
5.4 documents are of particular importance: Section 5.4 of the Form 
CO requires the submission of internal documents such as board 
presentations, surveys, analyses, reports and studies discussing the 
proposed concentration, the economic rationale for the concentration 
and competitive significance or the market context in which it takes 
place.9 
Although not mandatory, it is standard practice for the parties 
and their advisors to engage in pre-notification contacts with the case 
team at Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Competition”) so 
as to determine, among other things, the exact scope of information to 
                                                            
5. The Form CO is set out as Annex I to the Implementing Regulation, supra note 3 
[hereinafter Form CO].  
6. Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5-6.  
7. The Short Form CO is set out as Annex II to the Implementing Regulation, supra note 
3 [hereinafter Short Form CO]. 
8. See Commission Press Release, Mergers: Commission Consults on Proposal for 
Simplifying under the EU Merger Regulation, IP/13/288, (Mar. 27, 2013) (mentioning that the 
proposed changes that were put in place later that year “could allow up to 70% of the all 
notified mergers to qualify for review under the Commission’s simplified procedure, i.e., about 
10% more than today”).  
9. See DG Competition’s Best Practices on the Conduct of EC Merger Control 
Proceedings, ¶ 17 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Merger Best Practices]. 
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be submitted, thereby minimizing the risk of a decision of 
incompleteness.10 During pre-notification, the parties may seek to 
confirm whether the simplified procedure is available and whether 
information waivers can be obtained. Such waivers with regard to 
mandatory information requirements will be granted where “the 
Commission considers that compliance with those obligations or 
requirements is not necessary for the examination of the case.”11 One 
purpose of the amendments adopted in December 2013 is to facilitate 
a wider use of waivers.12 
B. Informational Burdens on the Notifying Parties 
While the text of the notification forms had not undergone any 
material changes until the recent adoption of the Merger 
Simplification Package, in practice, the informational burdens have 
grown considerably over the years, together with a significant 
increase in the importance, scope and duration of the pre-notification 
phase. The following points are worth mentioning in that regard.     
First, where there are complex issues of jurisdiction or 
substance, informal meetings and discussions between the merging 
parties and the Commission’s case team can stretch over an extensive 
period of time―from a few weeks to several months. Stakeholders 
have complained that sometimes even for cases qualifying for 
treatment under the simplified procedure, the pre-notification phase 
has been quite lengthy. This has changed lately as part of the 
December 2013 streamlining process. Indeed, the Notice on 
Simplified Procedure now acknowledges that: 
[P]re-notification contacts, in particular the submission of a draft 
notification, may be less useful in cases . . . where there are no 
reportable markets since the parties are not engaged in business 
activities in the same product and geographic market, or in a 
product market which is upstream or downstream from a product 
                                                            
10. See id. § 3 (regarding pre-notification contacts). The Merger Simplification Package 
has also provided clarifications on pre-notification contacts in the Introductory Part (point 1.2) 
of the revised Form CO [hereinafter Revised Form CO] and the Introductory Part (point 1.3) of 
the revised Short Form CO [hereinafter Revised Short Form CO]. 
11. See Implementing Regulation, supra note 3, art. 4(2).  
12. See Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.4(g); see also 
Revised Short Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.6(g). 
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market in which any other party to the concentration is 
engaged.13 
Second, the amount and level of detail of the information 
requests from the case team during pre-notification discussions have 
considerably increased. By way of example, the Commission may ask 
for internal documents going back several years, which can prove to 
be a burdensome exercise for the notifying parties. The officials may 
ask for sales and market share data over many years under a number 
of market definition alternatives. It is also not unusual for the 
Commission to ask for far more contact details than is requested in 
the Form CO. In more complex cases, the Commission will encourage 
the notifying party, and it will be in that party’s interest, to provide a 
detailed competitive analysis for each of the “most affected” markets. 
This may lead to several drafts of the notification form being 
submitted as a result of requests for clarification and/or additional 
questions from the case team―which itself may already be in contact 
with interested third parties about possible concerns raised by the 
proposed transaction. 
Third, a further testimony of the increased informational burdens 
borne by the notifying parties lies in the length of the final version of  
Form CO documents nowadays. While our experience shows that in 
the 1990s, the length of notification forms submitted to the 
Commission was rarely over 200 pages (and in the early 1990s, less 
than 100 pages), in recent years, Form COs have sometimes exceeded 
500 pages and may be supplemented by many “work product” 
annexes to be prepared by the notifying party.  
C. The Merger Simplification Package 
The Commission’s revisions under the Merger Simplification 
Package, which entered into force on January 1, 2014, encompass a 
series of revised documents, including a revised Notice on Simplified 
Procedure and amendments to the Implementing Regulation. The aim 
of the Merger Simplification Package is to simplify the Commission’s 
merger review procedure in three ways: (i) by expanding the scope of 
the simplified procedure, the net effect of which is expected to 
increase the number of notifications eligible for simplified treatment 
from around sixty percent in 2013 to around seventy percent in the 
future; (ii) by reducing the information burden on the parties more 
                                                            
13. Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 3, ¶ 23.  
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generally, including in cases notified using the standard Form CO; 
and (iii) by streamlining the pre-notification process.14 
The revisions made to the Forms annexed to the Implementing 
Regulation consist primarily in streamlining the information 
requirements for notifying mergers. These changes include an 
increase in the market share thresholds for so-called “affected 
markets” (from fifteen percent to twenty percent for horizontal 
overlaps, and from twenty-five percent to thirty percent for vertical 
relationships),15 the aim of which is to reduce the number of markets 
that are defined as “affected” and thus require a detailed description 
or a full Form CO. Reductions in certain sections of the revised Form 
CO also include the removal of the requirement to provide 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) calculations. Other revisions 
aim to simplify the procedural and/or informational requirements in 
certain circumstances where the previously more burdensome 
treatment was not warranted. In particular, a “super-simplified 
notification” procedure is introduced in relation to joint ventures that 
do not have activities in the European Economic Area (“EEA”).16 
Under the White Paper adopted in July 2014, the Commission is even 
providing to exempt such joint ventures from notification to the 
Commission.17  
Further, the Commission has included in the revised Form CO 
additional references to categories of information for which, based on 
the Commission’s experience, it may be appropriate to submit, in pre-
notification, a written request for a waiver. Such categories are as 
follows: data on participations in other undertakings, details of past 
acquisitions of undertakings, categories (ii) and (iii) of section 5.4 
documents, requested information for certain affected markets or for 
certain other markets in which the notified operation may have a 
significant impact, value or volume-based data for market size and 
shares, capacity data, details of cooperative agreements, and contact 
details for trade associations.18 
However, the Merger Simplification Package also includes 
amendments that may increase the informational burdens on the 
                                                            
14. See Commission MEMO/13/1098, Mergers: Commission Adopts Package 
Simplifying Procedures under the EU Merger Regulation, Frequently Asked Questions (Dec. 
5, 2013) [hereinafter Commission MEMO/13/1098]. 
15. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, §  6.3.  
16. Revised Short Form CO, supra note 10, § 8.  
17. See White Paper, supra note 4, ¶ 77.  
18. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, nn.15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31. 
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parties, although admittedly these changes codify what has become 
best practice in recent years. The following points are particularly 
noteworthy in that regard. 
First, the Commission has expanded the scope of the 
requirement to provide supporting documents in the revised Form 
CO. In particular, Section 5.4 now refers to additional categories of 
documents to which access must be given: (i) minutes of the board 
and shareholders’ meetings at which the transaction has been 
discussed; (ii) board and shareholder documents where the transaction 
is discussed in relation to potential alternative acquisitions;19 and (iii) 
board and shareholder documents from the last two years that assess 
any of the affected markets with respect to market shares, competitive 
conditions, competitors (actual and potential), potential for sales 
growth or expansion into other product or geographic markets, and/or 
general market conditions. A requirement to submit internal 
documents is now also introduced into the revised Short Form CO in 
relation to cases that give rise to horizontal and/or vertical 
relationships between the merging companies. Further, notifying 
parties will now need to provide copies of documents prepared “by or 
for” any members of the board or the shareholders’ meeting as well as 
copies of documents “received by” those individuals. Accordingly, 
the requirement to submit internal documents may now also catch 
externally prepared market analyses, reports, studies, surveys, 
presentations and any comparable documents that are received by 
members of the board or the shareholders’ meeting.  
Second, new wording appears in the revised notification forms 
requiring notifying parties to present information not only on the 
relevant product and geographic market definitions which the parties 
put forward but also on “plausible alternative” product and 
geographic market definitions. The Commission specifies that 
“plausible alternative product and geographic market definitions can 
be identified on the basis of previous Commission decisions and 
judgments of the Union Courts and (in particular where there are no 
                                                            
19. See Commission MEMO/13/1098, supra note 14 (responding to criticism voiced in 
relation to this requirement during the public consultation, the Commission has stated that it 
“certainly does not want to look at a company’s entire internal M&A track record […]. 
Documents that are completely unrelated to the notified transaction do not have to be 
provided. Documents that are relevant are those that analyse the transaction that is notified in 
relation to alternative acquisitions.”).  
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Commission or Court precedents) by reference to industry reports, 
market studies and the notifying parties’ internal documents.”20  
II. POST-FILING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION BY THE 
NOTIFYING PARTIES 
A. Requests for Information 
According to Article 11 of the EU Merger Regulation 
(“EUMR”), the Commission has the power to request information by 
simple request or by decision from the notifying parties and other 
undertakings. The distinction between a simple request for 
information and a request by decision is particularly important when 
assessing the consequences of not supplying information within the 
required time limits. Failure to respond to a request by decision may 
give rise to fines and/or periodic penalty payments.21  
As explained under Part I.A above, it has become customary 
over the years for the merging parties to engage in pre-notification 
consultations with the Commission. The Merger Best Practices 
explain that the early submission of information relating to all 
potentially affected markets and possible competition concerns, 
copies of internal documents that are to be provided with the 
notification form, and any elements demonstrating efficiency claims 
that the parties propose to make “. . . may avoid requests for 
additional information from the notifying parties at a late stage in the 
procedure and possible declarations of incompleteness. . . .”22 
In many earlier cases, pre-notification discussions―together 
with the provision of a substantially complete draft notification (or of 
multiple drafts depending on the complexity of the case) for the case 
team to review and comment on―ensured that, upon formal filing, 
notification forms contained to a large extent all information deemed 
necessary by the case team to assess the concentration. As a result, the 
number and breadth of Article 11 information requests for the 
notifying party received after the effective notification date were 
relatively limited. 
The extent of the information to be provided by the parties for 
the purpose of notifying a merger to the Commission has considerably 
                                                            
20. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, § 6.  
21. EUMR, supra note 1, arts. 14(1)(c), 15(1)(a).  
22. Merger Best Practices, supra note 9, ¶ 16.  
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developed over the years, as detailed under Part I.B above. As a 
result, pre-notification discussions have become lengthier and 
notification forms increasingly more detailed. Despite this, the 
merging parties may sometimes face detailed information requests 
after formal submission of a Form CO. Such requests may subject the 
notifying parties to data-gathering exercises to be completed within 
very short deadlines, generally a couple of days. Requests to provide 
further internal documents have become particularly burdensome as 
they are typically increasingly broadly defined (generally calling for 
production across several years) and most often not tied to any 
particular custodian. In most cases, it remains for the notifying parties 
to delineate themselves the scope of the documents to which access 
must be given and to identify likely custodians from which to 
download e-mail folders and collect hard copy documents through 
site visits. As an illustration of this, we cite below two sample 
requests for the production of internal documents on which we have 
assisted notifying parties.  
The first example is: “Please provide all internal documents, 
including briefings, e-mails, memos of meetings, presentations, for 
the past two years . . . , and external documents discussing: . . .” This 
document collection request was made during Phase II proceedings 
and was one of many questions included in an Article 11 request for 
information. Eight topics were listed in relation to which the 
documents were to be provided over a two-year time frame. 
The second example is: “Please submit for the below mentioned 
products for the EEA and for the [affected] markets (as indicated in 
the 6(1)c decision): All analyses, memorandums, reports, reviews, 
presentations of any format, performed either internally or by third 
parties (such as external consultants or financial institutions), and 
used in preparation, in the realization, and follow-up of the decision 
making process or reporting related to these products.” This document 
collection request was also made during Phase II proceedings. No 
time frame was specified as regards the creation of the requested 
documents. There were many affected markets listed in the Article 
6(1)(c) decision. The deadline to respond was seven days. 
B. “Stop-the-Clock” and Declarations of Incompleteness 
There are various means by which the strict statutory deadlines 
for the Commission to review a notified transaction under the EUMR 
10 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
may be suspended or reset, including declarations of incompleteness 
and “stop-the-clock” mechanisms. 
In the event that the Commission discovers after formal 
notification that the information contained in the (Short) Form CO is 
incomplete in any material respect, it will give the parties an 
opportunity to urgently rectify such omissions before a declaration of 
incompleteness is adopted. The time permitted for such rectification is 
typically no longer than one or two days. However, if the 
Commission finds that the omissions immediately hinder the proper 
investigation of the proposed transaction, it will adopt a declaration of 
incompleteness (or the parties may withdraw the notification). In such 
a case, the notification will only become effective, and the Phase I 
deadlines will only start to run, on the date on which the complete 
information is received by the Commission.23 
Further, at any point during Phase I or Phase II, the clock may be 
stopped where, owing to circumstances for which one of the 
undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible, the 
Commission has had to request information by decision pursuant to 
Article 11 or order an inspection by decision pursuant to Article 13.24 
Given that most merger filings are preceded by a lengthy and 
detailed pre-notification phase, the aim of which is to ensure that the 
notification form is complete, the use of the stop-the-clock provision 
and declarations of incompleteness is relatively exceptional, as 
explicitly mentioned in Article 10(4) itself. However, they may occur 
in some cases. For example, the recent Zimmer-Biomet merger,25 
notified to the Commission on 3 June 2014, was declared incomplete 
on 11 June 2014, supposedly because the parties filed with no or little 
pre-notification discussions. 
It is also interesting to note that while decisions to stop the clock 
in order to seek additional information from the parties traditionally 
occur in the early stages of a Phase II probe (i.e. when the 
Commission is engaged in intensive information gathering), in more 
recent reviews the Commission has stopped the clock at a later stage 
of its investigations, after entering into remedy discussions with the 
merging parties. This is generally aimed at giving the Commission 
additional time to assess in greater depth the remedy package. A stop-
                                                            
23. Implementing Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5(2); Merger Best Practices, supra note 
9, ¶ 23; EUMR, supra note 1, art. 10(1). 
24. EUMR, supra note 1, art. 10(4).  
25. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.7265 (Zimmer/Biomet), (ongoing). 
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the-clock decision at such a late stage of the procedure was adopted in 
the context of the Commission’s reviews of Telefónica’s purchase of 
E-Plus (approved subject to conditions)26 and Hutchison’s acquisition 
of O2 Ireland (cleared by the Commission subject to conditions).27 
More recently, in the context of its ongoing review of Liberty 
Global’s planned acquisition of Ziggo, the Commission also decided 
to stop the clock after having received and market-tested the remedies 
offered by Liberty Global.28 
C. Impact of the Merger Simplification Package 
As described under Part I.C above, a number of changes 
included in the Merger Simplification Package may prove more 
burdensome for parties looking to file a merger notification with the 
Commission. This is particularly the case as regards the amendments 
to section 5.4 of the revised Form CO (and the insertion of a similar 
requirement to provide internal business documents in the revised 
Short Form CO), and the requirement for the notifying parties to 
present (and thus describe in detail) “all plausible alternative product 
and geographic market definitions.” 
While such amendments undoubtedly have the potential to 
increase the amount of information exchanged with the case team 
during pre-notification and provided in the notification form, they 
may reduce the number and volume of requests for additional 
information addressed to the parties―whether informally or pursuant 
to Article 11 of the EUMR―after the effective notification date. 
However, other revisions are a clear indication that the 
Commission reserves the right to request further information from the 
notifying parties at any time. This is the case even in relation to 
sections of the Form CO and Short Form CO that the Merger 
Simplification Package aims to streamline. For example, although the 
requirement to provide contact details for the five largest independent 
suppliers to the parties to the concentration has been removed from 
the revised Form CO, the Commission has highlighted in a new 
footnote that it may at any time request additional contact details for 
any category of market participants, whether identified or not in the 
                                                            
26. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.7018 (Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus), 
(July 2, 2014). 
27. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6992 (Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica 
Ireland), (May 28, 2014). 
28. See Commission Decision No. COMP/ M.7000 (Liberty Global/Ziggo), (ongoing).  
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revised Form CO. The revised notification forms also expressly state 
that information that the Commission has waived during the pre-
notification phase may nonetheless be subsequently required from the 
notifying parties.29 
III. MARKET TESTING BY THE COMMISSION 
The Commission actively engages in so-called “market testing” 
in order to verify and supplement the information collected from the 
notifying parties. The Commission is given wide powers to seek 
qualitative and quantitative data from, and the views of, a wide range 
of market players, in particular customers, competitors and suppliers. 
Further, where remedies are offered, the Commission will market-test 
them with third parties, generally those who have been most active in 
providing information during the investigation or have expressed a 
desire to be consulted. 
The Commission’s investigative powers were enhanced during 
the 2004 merger reform to broadly align them with those available 
under Council Regulation 1/2003 for Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).30 In 
order to carry out the duties assigned to it by the EUMR, the 
Commission is vested with the powers to request information,31 to 
conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of 
undertakings,32 and to impose fines and periodic penalty payments for 
breach of the obligations under the EUMR.33  
The most common tool to gather evidence is through written 
requests for information, which are typically sent nowadays by way 
of e-questionnaires and may be followed by supplementary calls 
and/or formal and informal third-party (telephone) interviews with a 
view to clarifying responses and gathering further information. Over 
the years, there has been a creeping increase in the length and detail 
of questionnaires sent to market participants, mainly customers of the 
notifying parties and to a lesser extent their (actual or potential) 
                                                            
29. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.4(g); Revised Short 
Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.6(g).  
30. Council Regulation No. 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L1/1 (now Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU). 
31. See EUMR, supra note 1, art. 11; see also supra Part II.A (the Commission may 
require information by simple request or by decision). 
32. EUMR, supra note 1, art. 13.  
33. Id. arts. 14, 15.  
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competitors and suppliers. Further, many such requests go 
unanswered or are answered in a very summary fashion. In particular, 
responses are often limited to a mere “yes” or “no” without any 
reasons provided to substantiate them, and they are thus of little value 
to the Commission’s investigation. For instance, one might question 
the robustness of findings that are based on statements such as: “the 
majority of the respondents to the market test consider that . . .” or “9 
out of 17 respondents state that. . . .” As regards the written 
questionnaires, the Commission has held on several occasions that: 
[I]t is important to note that the market investigation is by no 
means an opinion poll. For instance, the fact that the majority of 
third parties provide a similar opinion in reply to a specific 
question, can only be an indication for the Commission’s own 
investigation, not a foregone conclusion. Likewise, it would not 
be appropriate to assume that the answers to the questionnaires 
can always be considered to be fully informed and objective. The 
specific level of knowledge of respondents might vary, the 
questions might have been misunderstood, the replies might be 
more or less representative, and the opinion provided might be 
biased to influence the Commission’s decision-making process in 
a certain way.34 
The following cases are particularly revealing in that regard. 
First, as part of the Commission’s market investigation into the 
proposed acquisition of MAN by Volkswagen,35 many questionnaires 
were sent to a wide range of market participants. More than 1,000 
questionnaires were sent to truck customers, of whom only around 
fifteen percent responded. Only a small number of customers (12% of 
the respondents) indicated that prices could rise after the merger. Half 
of these customers were based in national markets where the 
combined market share of the notifying parties in the overall heavy 
truck market would be below thirty-five percent. The remaining 
customers did not substantiate their claims. 
Second, in the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and 
NYSE Euronext,36 which was ultimately blocked by the Commission, 
                                                            
34. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6663, (Ryanair/Aer Lingus III), ¶ 28 (Feb. 
27, 2013); see also Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶ 39 
(June 27, 2007); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6314 (Telefónica UK/Vodafone 
UK/Everything Everywhere/JV), ¶ 23 (Sept. 4, 2012).  
35. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6267 (Volkswagen/Man), (Sept. 26, 2011).  
36. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6166 (Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext), (Feb. 
1, 2012).  
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the case team conducted a wide-reaching market investigation. In this 
context, in the first phase, the Commission sent over 600 detailed 
Article 11 requests for information covering seven different groups of 
market participants, of which only approximately 250 responses were 
received. In the second phase, over 150 questionnaires were sent to 
targeted market participants, of which only around 100 responses 
were received. Further, more than twenty teleconferences and 
meetings were conducted with a range of customers and competitors. 
Third, in Universal’s proposed acquisition of EMI’s recorded 
music business,37 which was cleared subject to conditions, the 
Commission launched a market test of the commitments submitted by 
the notifying party, by sending 238 questionnaires to both customers 
and competitors of the notifying party. In the words of the 
Commission itself, “a number of customers provided very 
rudimentary (and therefore not very meaningful) replies to the market 
test questionnaire, essentially limited to answering yes or no to 
specific questions without providing any explanation of the reasons 
supporting their reply.”38 
Fourth, in the context of Outokumpu’s proposed acquisition of 
Inoxum,39 which was approved subject to conditions, the Commission 
carried out an extensive market investigation both in Phase I and II. 
Overall, it sent out 2,251 questionnaires to customers (including 
distributors) of the notifying parties and fifty questionnaires to their 
competitors, and conducted a significant number of interviews with a 
number of third parties. The Commission also market-tested the 
commitments submitted by the parties by means of eight sets of 
questionnaires as well as a number of telephone calls. 
In terms of inspections carried out by the Commission, the 
acquisition of MWM by Caterpillar in October 2011 is particularly 
interesting. Inspections pursuant to Article 13(4) of the EUMR were 
carried out at the premises of CAT in the United Kingdom and of 
MWM in Germany, and were continued at the Commission’s 
premises in Brussels.40 Those inspections, which lasted six days, were 
undertaken because the Commission had indications that the parties 
might have: (i) provided misleading information in response to 
                                                            
37. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music), 
(Sept. 21, 2012).  
38. Id. at n. 497. 
39. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6471 (Outokumpu/Inoxum), (Nov. 7, 2012). 
40. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6106 (Caterpillar/MWM), ¶ 14 (Oct. 19, 2011).  
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Article 11 information requests; (ii) provided misleading information 
in the notification of the proposed concentration; and (iii) 
implemented the notified concentration before it had been cleared by 
the Commission in contravention of Article 7(1) of the EUMR. 
Site visits to the manufacturing or other facilities of the parties to 
the concentration, their competitors, customers and/or suppliers may 
also sometimes be undertaken by the Commission. For example, as 
part of its extensive market investigation into the proposed 
concentration between Outokumpu and Inoxum, the Commission 
organized a site visit to Outokumpu’s premises in Finland and to one 
of the parties’ major customers in the Netherlands in order to gain a 
better understanding of the industry in which the transaction was to 
take place.41 
Customer surveys are also occasionally used in merger control 
cases to help define the relevant (product and geographic) market(s) 
and assess competition within them.42 For example, in Ryanair’s first 
attempt to acquire Aer Lingus, which was prohibited in June 2007, 
the Commission conducted a customer survey at Dublin Airport 
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a representative sample of 
responses from customers who departed from Dublin to test Ryanair’s 
claim that, from the perspective of the customer, Aer Lingus and 
Ryanair do not compete with each other. The Commission explained 
that such a survey was necessary to gather the views of affected 
individual customers (i.e. approximately 14 million passengers 
traveling with the merging parties) which, unlike so-called “business 
customers,” could not be contacted by the Commission by way of the 
classic investigative techniques (questionnaires, telephone interviews) 
in a meaningful way.43  
Further, where the Commission believes it is desirable, in the 
interests of the fact-finding investigation, to hear in a single forum the 
opposing views that have been put forward by the notifying parties 
and third parties as to key market data and characteristics and the 
effects of the concentration on competition in the markets concerned, 
                                                            
41. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6471 (Outokumpu/Inoxum), ¶ 114 (Nov. 7, 
2012). 
42. See Ian Thompson & James Harvey, When to Pop the Question(s)? The Use of 
Surveys in Merger Control, 35 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 92 (2014). These authors argue 
that “a survey will give the best results if it mimics the environmental and product 
characteristics of the market.” Id. 
43. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶¶ 35-36, Annex I 
(June 27, 2007). 
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it may decide to invite them to “triangular” meetings. Such triangular 
meetings are on a voluntary basis and in addition to bilateral meetings 
between the Commission and the notifying parties, other involved 
parties or third parties.44 However, to date, the use of triangular 
meetings as an investigatory instrument has been somewhat limited. 
IV. AN INCREASING USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
In addition to gathering an increasing amount of internal 
documents and similar evidence from the notifying parties and (more 
rarely) third parties, economic analyses, including modeling when 
appropriate, have become more widely used in European merger 
control, especially but not exclusively in the more complex cases.45 In 
this regard, it is worth noting that the Merger Simplification Package 
has included in the revised Form CO a non-binding request for 
economic data in cases in which quantitative economic analysis for 
the affected markets is likely to be useful.46 While such information is 
not required for the Form CO to be considered complete, the notifying 
parties are nevertheless encouraged to provide the data as early as 
possible, particularly in light of the strict statutory deadlines for 
Union merger control. 
A number of elements have contributed to an increasing use by 
the Commission of economics to define markets and analyze their 
functioning, assess closeness of competition, predict the likely (price) 
effects of mergers, validate efficiency claims or predict the impact of 
remedies, as well as to generate evidence through a range of empirical 
techniques. The following elements are particularly noteworthy in 
that regard: 
First, in 2003, the economic capabilities of DG Competition 
were enhanced, in particular through the appointment of the Chief 
Competition Economist (“CCE”). The CCE, currently Professor 
Massimo Motta, is part of DG Competition and assists in evaluating 
the economic impact of its actions. The Chief Economist Team 
(“CET”), headed by the CCE, is composed of over twenty specialized 
economists, many of whom hold a Ph.D. in industrial organization. 
The main tasks of the CCE and his office are: (i) to provide 
independent guidance on methodological issues of economics and 
                                                            
44. See Merger Best Practices, supra note 9, ¶¶ 38, 39.  
45. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 245-60.  
46. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.8. 
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econometrics in the application of EU competition rules; (ii) to 
provide general guidance in individual competition cases from their 
early stages; (iii) to provide detailed guidance in the most important 
competition cases involving complex economic issues and requiring 
sophisticated quantitative analysis; and (iv) to contribute to the 
development of general policy instruments with an economic content, 
as well as assist with cases pending before the Community Courts.47 
Second, as part of the 2004 merger reform, the previous 
substantive merger test based on the creation or strengthening of 
dominance was replaced by a significant impediment to effective 
competition (“SIEC”) test. Further, guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers48 and non-horizontal mergers49 were adopted in 
2004 and 2008, respectively. 
Third, in October 2011, the Commission published best practices 
for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases 
concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in 
merger cases (“Economic Best Practices”).50 The Economic Best 
Practices, which are guided by a desire to ensure transparency and 
accountability, provide practical guidance on: (i) the content and 
presentation of economic or econometric analysis in order “to 
facilitate its assessment and the replication of any empirical results by 
the Commission and/or other parties,” and (ii) how to respond to 
Commission requests for quantitative data “to ensure that timely and 
relevant input for the investigation can be provided.”51 On the latter 
point, the Economic Best Practices place great emphasis on the 
usefulness of early consultation with the Commission on the 
availability of quantitative data. Such early consultation will allow 
one to determine not only what data is available and its suitability, but 
also in what form it can be provided, thereby facilitating the provision 
of the data should the Commission make a data request.52 Further, the 
                                                            
47. See Lars-Hendrik Röller & Pierre A. Buigues, The Office of the Chief Competition 
Economist at the European Commission (May 2005) (providing a more detailed description of 
the role of the CCE and his office). 
48. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. C 31/5.  
49. Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. C 265/6.  
50. Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in 
Cases Concerning the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases (DG 
Competition Staff Working Document, Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Economic Best Practices]. 
51. Id. ¶ 5.  
52. Id. ¶¶ 73-76.  
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Economic Best Practices stress the importance of cooperation in good 
faith between the parties and the Commission in order to help both 
sides deal more efficiently with data issues.53 
The types of data used by the Commission for its quantitative 
economic analysis in merger cases vary depending on the specificities 
of the market(s) and data availability. This data is most commonly 
collected from industry sources or from companies themselves. The 
following are examples of types of economic data that the 
Commission has deemed useful in recent merger cases:54 
First, where a concentration between producers of retail products 
that are sold to end-consumers takes place, “retail scanner data” is 
often available, in particular via market research companies such as 
Nielsen. Such transaction data about consumers’ purchases in a 
representative sample of stores and over a significant period of time 
can prove useful on a number of fronts. For example, the product 
classifications contained in these datasets may provide first proxies of 
the relevant market segmentations in the industry. Such market data 
may also furnish useful information on the price positioning of the 
parties’ brands and the competitive constraints exerted by the parties 
on each other. Further, as it is typically readily available, retail 
scanner data can be used to rapidly check the arguments put forward 
by the parties and other market participants. A recent case in which 
scanner data has been relied on by the Commission is the 
Unilever/Sara Lee merger, which was cleared subject to conditions. 
This case is particularly noteworthy in that the Commission 
conducted a merger simulation by its own economists in order to 
predict the likely impact of the proposed transaction on the deodorant 
markets.55 
Second, “bidding data” may prove particularly useful in 
assessing a concentration between providers of services that business 
customers purchase through structured procurement processes where 
candidate suppliers bid against each other. Where such data is 
available and is representative (in the sense that it covers a large 
enough sample of tenders/bids), its analysis will likely provide 
                                                            
53. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.  
54. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 248-59; see also Revised Form CO, 
supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.8.  
55. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5658 (Unilever/Sara Lee), (Nov. 17, 2010). For 
the merger simulation conducted in that case, see in particular the Technical Annex to the 
decision. See also Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5644 (Kraft Foods/Cadbury), (Jan. 6, 
2010). 
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valuable information on the closeness of competition between the 
parties. Recent cases in which bidding data was gathered and 
analyzed by the Commission to assess the competitive constraint 
exerted by the parties on each other include the Baxter 
International/Gambro merger,56 which was approved subject to 
conditions, as well as the Siemens/Invensys Rail concentration,57 
which the Commission also approved. 
Third, data on customer switching may be particularly relevant 
for the purpose of assessing closeness of competition. Upward pricing 
pressure (“UPP”) measures make it possible to estimate the extent to 
which the merged firm would have the incentive to raise prices post-
merger given, in particular, prices, margins and diversion ratios 
observed in the market. However, the extent to which such measures 
will yield valuable results is inherently a function of the reliability of 
the inputted data, particularly the diversion ratio measure used in the 
UPP analysis. Further, such measures must not be reviewed in 
isolation but rather in the context of other pieces of empirical 
evidence.58 A UPP-type exercise was conducted, for example, by the 
Commission in the Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria merger,59 
which was cleared subject to conditions. 
As emphasized in the Economic Best Practices,60 it is critical to 
ensure that quantitative analysis is used only in those cases for which 
sufficient accurate data exists and can be gathered and analyzed in a 
timely fashion so as to generate meaningful results, while at the same 
time reducing the burden on the involved parties and the Commission 
posed by the production and processing of such data. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that even though the Commission increasingly relies 
on econometric evidence in merger control, it has on a number of 
occasions considered that conducting a quantitative economic 
analysis was not appropriate in a given case. For example, in its 
investigation into the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and 
NYSE Euronext, which was ultimately prohibited, the Commission 
                                                            
56. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6851 (Baxter International/Gambro), (July 22, 
2013). 
57. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6843 (Siemens/Invensys Rail), (Apr. 18, 2013). 
58. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 255-56 (regarding UPP-type 
exercises). 
59. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6497 (Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria), 
(Dec. 12, 2012). The exact test used by the Commission in this case is the “gross upward 
pricing pressure index” (“GUPPI”) test, which is a spin-off of the UPP test. 
60. See Economic Best Practices, supra note 50, ¶¶ 51-52.  
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concluded that “conducting any empirical analysis, in particular for 
market definition purposes, would not have been meaningful given 
the lack of suitable data required for those purposes.”61 Also, in the 
assessment of the proposed creation of a joint venture between 
Vodafone, Telefónica and Everything Everywhere in the field of 
mobile commerce in the UK, the Commission considered that 
“[g]iven the nascent state of the markets under consideration, there is 
limited data available and therefore no extensive empirical analysis 
could be undertaken.”62 Further, while in Ryanair/Aer Lingus the 
available quantitative data was deemed sufficiently complete, 
accurate and adequate to enable the Commission to conduct a 
thorough empirical analysis (including two sets of regression analysis 
to identify the level of competitive constraints exercised between the 
parties and by their competitors as well as a price correlation 
analysis),63 this was not the case in Olympic/Aegean Airlines.64 In the 
context of the investigation related to the latter transaction, the 
Commission clearly laid out the pre-conditions that need to be met for 
a sophisticated empirical analysis to be informative:  
(i) All the necessary data must be available to implement the 
chosen empirical methodology and the available data must be of 
adequate quality, otherwise the significance of the results 
obtained is at most very limited; (ii) Empirical analysis in merger 
cases necessarily involves the use of historical data. Thus, the 
data to be usable in such analyses need to be a good indicator of 
the likely impact of the merger on future competition; and (iii) 
The sufficient variability in the data to identify references for 
comparison.65 
                                                            
61. Commission Decision No. COMP/.6166 (Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext), ¶ 251 
(Feb. 1, 2012). 
62. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6314 (Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/ Everything 
Everywhere/JV), ¶ 20 (Sept. 4, 2012). However, the Commission did consider and assess a 
numerical analysis of foreclosure incentives submitted by the notifying parties. 
63. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶ 34, Annexes III, 
IV (June 27, 2007).  
64. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5830 (Olympic/Aegean Airlines), (Jan. 26, 
2011). Note that Aegean’s first attempt to merge with Olympic in 2011 was blocked by the 
Commission. However, the Commission subsequently approved the merger in 2013. See 
Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6796 (Aegean/Olympic II), (Oct. 9, 2013) (not yet 
published). 
65. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5830 (Olympic/Aegean Airlines), ¶ 30 (Jan. 26, 
2011). 
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Finally, it is also interesting to note that in a number of recent 
merger cases, the Commission’s market investigation has included a 
so-called “market reconstruction” exercise. In particular, in several 
cases, the Commission has sought to reconstruct the market shares of 
the main players for some affected product categories or countries in 
order to aid in its assessment of the notified transaction’s 
compatibility with the common market. For example, in its Phase II 
investigation of the Johnson & Johnson/Synthes merger, the 
Commission reconstructed market shares in more than 50 product 
markets in 30 countries in order to verify the accuracy of the parties’ 
estimates as the market data provided by the parties was deemed not 
reliable in some instances.66 This resulted in the creation of a model, 
producing market share data for the parties and a considerable number 
of competitors, per product and geographic market.67 Market 
reconstructions were also conducted, for example, in the acquisition 
of Pride Foods (Gerber Emig) by Refresco (cleared subject to 
conditions),68 in the US Airways/American Airlines merger (approved 
subject to conditions),69 in the Cisco/Tandberg merger (cleared 
subject to conditions),70 and in the acquisition of Varian by Agilent 
(approved subject to conditions).71 
V. “DATA ROOM” PROCEDURE 
As a result of the growing use by the Commission of economic 
analysis, econometric tools and market reconstruction in European 
merger control, notifying parties have increasingly requested that the 
data, as well as the aggregating tools (e.g. Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets) and models on which the Commission has based its 
assessment be disclosed to them in order to verify the veracity and 
accuracy of the Commission’s analysis and the nature of the 
underlying data. In particular, notifying parties typically want to test 
the Commission’s approach in at least four respects. First, the choice 
                                                            
66. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6266 (Johnson & Johnson/Synthes), § 6.1.2 
(April 18, 2012). 
67. See Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6266 (Johnson & 
Johnson/Synthes), ¶ 4 (Apr. 3, 2012). 
68. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6924 (Refresco Group/Pride Foods), (Oct. 4, 
2013). 
69. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6607 (US Airways/American Airlines), (Aug. 5, 
2013). 
70. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5669 (Cisco/Tandberg), (Mar. 29, 2010). 
71. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5611 (Agilent/Varian), (Jan. 20, 2010). 
22 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
and quality of raw data selected for analysis. Second, the methods for 
aggregating that data to incorporate it into models and analyses. 
Third, the models used to “crunch” the data and the analysis of it. 
Fourth, whether data has been accurately transferred from models to 
Statements of Objections (“SOs”) and other documents produced by 
the Commission.  
The Economic Best Practices provide that “[w]hen granting 
access to the file, the Commission may provide upon request the data 
and codes underlying its final economic analysis or, to the extent that 
they have been made available to the Commission, that of third 
parties on which it intends to rely or take into account.”72 One of the 
barriers to such access is the often confidential nature of the data, 
which will typically have been provided by competitors of the 
notifying parties and/or by other market participants. In order to 
manage this conflict between respect for confidentiality and the rights 
of defense of the notifying parties, the Economic Best Practices 
provide that “[w]here necessary to protect the confidentiality of other 
parties’ data, access to the data and codes will be granted only at DG 
Competition premises in a so-called data room procedure, subject to 
strict confidentiality obligations and secure procedures.”73  
The Commission’s Hearing Officers act as an independent 
arbiter where a dispute about the effective exercise of procedural 
rights between parties and DG Competition arises in antitrust and 
merger proceedings. They are frequently involved in decisions as to 
whether the data room procedure is in a given case the most 
appropriate tool to reconcile confidentiality requirements with 
considerations relating to the right to be heard.74 
Under the data room procedure,75 which needs to be adjusted to 
the specifics of each case, part of the file, including confidential 
information, is gathered in a physical data room at the Commission’s 
                                                            
72. Economic Best Practices, supra note 50, ¶ 47.  
73. Id.  
74. See Decision of the President of the European Commission No. 2011/695/EU on the 
Function and Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer in Certain Competition Proceedings, 
2011 O.J. L 275/29, Chapter 4. 
75. The Commission indicates that the data room procedure is along the same lines as 
that used in antitrust cases. See Commission Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of 
Proceedings Concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 2011 O.J. C308/6, ¶¶ 97-98; see also 
European Commission, DG Competition Antitrust Manual of Procedures, Internal DG 
Competition Working Documents on Procedures for the Application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, Chapter 12, ¶¶ 111-119 (Mar. 2012).   
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premises. Access to the data room is granted to a restricted group of 
persons, usually economic advisors of the notifying parties and in 
some cases external legal counsel.76 The economic advisors and 
external legal counsel of the notifying parties that access the data 
room are required to sign a confidentiality agreement. They may 
produce a final report on the information contained in the data room 
but may not disclose any confidential information to their client.  
The importance of access to data used by the Commission for 
economic analysis and market reconstruction has been highlighted by 
numerous cases in which scrutiny of such data has been found to be 
wanting. These cases underline the importance of notifying parties’ 
ability to check the Commission’s use of economic analysis, from the 
raw data used all the way through to the transfer of data to the SO. 
It is not unusual that a discussion may arise over the extent of 
access to be granted. For example, in Universal/EMI,77 Universal 
requested that the Hearing Officer amend the procedural rules 
governing the use of the data room.78 In particular, it argued that its 
rights of defense would be violated because: (i) the scope of the 
disclosure was too narrow as it would not allow access to the raw data 
and relevant codes that were used to build the final datasets on which 
the CET’s economic analysis was run; (ii) specific provisions in the 
rules restricting the use of the data would prevent Universal’s 
economic advisors from properly verifying the CET’s analysis; and 
(iii) the anonymization of the CET data would prevent the economic 
advisors from understanding the specific factual context in which the 
data was generated. In response, the Hearing Officer amended the 
data room rules to ensure “that all raw data and codes would be 
included in the data room” and to allow Universal’s economic 
advisors “to conduct the tests and verifications of the CET’s analysis 
                                                            
76. Practice seems to vary between cases. For example, in Johnson & Johnson/Synthes, 
the Hearing Officer granted access to the data room to both the legal and economic advisors of 
the notifying parties, while in Universal Music Group/EMI Music, access was limited to 
external economists. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music 
Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 21, 2012) and Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case 
COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 11, 2012).  
77. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music), 
(Sept. 21, 2012).  
78. See Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music 
Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 11, 2012); see also Dafydd Nelson, Comment: Universal Merger 
Shows EU Data-Access Rules Can Be Eased, MLEX (2013). 
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indicated in the letter.”79 It also accepted limited disclosure of the 
confidential version of one of the economic advisors’ data room 
reports containing information used to calculate royalty figures of the 
parties. But the Hearing Officer considered that it was not 
indispensable to lift the anonymization of the data that contained 
sensitive business secrets. Further, it refused to grant full access to 
adverse quantitative analysis and to admit Universal’s legal advisors 
to the data room. This case is also interesting in that it shows that 
notifying parties are unlikely to be granted access to third-party data 
collected and used by the Commission prior to the issuance of the SO. 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of the information and data gathering in a merger 
investigation varies depending on the complexity of the case and the 
resources available. However, ever since the early days of the Merger 
Regulation, there has been a creeping increase in the range of 
information required to be provided by the merging parties in pre-
notification and in notification form, as well as in the volume and 
detail of data sought from the notifying parties, other involved parties 
and third parties (primarily customers, suppliers and competitors) 
through information requests, inspections, bilateral and triangular 
meetings, (telephone) interviews, customer surveys and other 
investigatory tools. In particular, the Commission has become much 
more demanding in relation to internal documents, often required to 
be produced by the notifying parties across several years. There has 
also been a significant rise in the use of economic analysis and 






79. Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music 
Group/EMI Music), ¶ 11 (Sept. 11, 2012). 
